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UGLY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEM OF 
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING UNDER THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
Daniel D. Polsby* 
and 
Robert D. Popper** 
INTRODUCTION 
If you have to ask, you can't afford it. -Attributed to J.P. Morgan1 
How ugly is too ugly? Shaw v. Reno 2 examines that important 
question in the course of rejecting North Carolina's 1990 effort to 
comply with the preclearance provisions in section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA). 3 But the problem presented is a general one that is 
apt to arise perennially in any territory-based system of representative 
democracy. What has "shape" to do with representation? Quite a lot, 
as we hope to demonstrate. 
In Shaw, North Carolina's congressional redistricting map - ugly 
enough as first proposed4 - was made uglier to accommodate the cre-
ation of a second "safe" district for an African-American representa-
tive. 5 In the jargon of electoral districting, an "ugly" map is one filled 
with irregular, uncompact shapes that do not evidently correspond to 
established political or natural boundaries. An ugly map implies that 
a human ambition of some kind, with politically strategic ulterior mo-
tives, has been hard at work. 
Pared to its simplest form, the question is this: Why does an effort 
to comply with conditions set by the Attorney General for 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A. 1964, Oakland Uni-
versity; J.D. 1971, University of Minnesota. - Ed. 
** Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1981, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1989, North-
western University. - Ed. The authors are grateful to Carl Auerbach, Karen Blinder, Bruce 
Cain, Robert Cooter, Mayer Freed, David Haddock, Gary Lawson, Bill Marshall, and Austin 
Ranney for taking time to discuss some of the questions raised by this article. Chris Kline fur-
nished valuable research assistance. The work was subsidized by the Kirkland & Ellis research 
fund of Northwestern University. Thanks and full absolutions to all. 
1. This quotation has been widely attributed to J.P. Morgan, who said "[a]ny man who has 
to ask about the annual upkeep of a yacht can't afford one." JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR Quo-
TATIONS 533 (16th ed. 1992) (attributing quotation to J.P. Morgan). 
2. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)). 
4. See Political Pornography, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at AlO; see also America's "Segre-
manders," WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1992, at Al4 (maps). 
5. 113 S. Ct. at 2819-21. 
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preclearance under the VRA 6 by consciously creating a district with 
certain racial demographics - through gerrymandering or otherwise 
- violate the Constitution? In North Carolina's case, the government 
created the very ugly Twelfth District to satisfy administrative 
preclearance procedures established by the VRA. Although the 
Supreme Court has read the VRA expansively in several cases, 7 the 
Shaw Court - shocked to find racial gerrymandering going on in the 
back room - remanded for a finding whether this sort of thing is 
absolutely necessary. s 
Of course, whether a racial gerrymander is necessary will depend 
upon a number of variables. Is it right to allow any form of race-based 
districting? If it is, may the districtmaking authorities attend to other 
political business first, and only take race into account afterward? The 
construction of nonugly districts might have been easier if the dis-
trictmakers were not trying to do so many things at once. The protec-
tion of minority voting interests was a concern to which North 
Carolina mapmakers turned only after they had other, more important 
fish fried, including ensuring reelection of incumbent members of Con-
gress9 - such as Steve Neal of the ugly Fifth District, chairman of the 
subcommittee that supervises the regulation of financial institutions; 
and Charlie Rose of the very ugly Seventh District, who chairs the 
House subcommittee with jurisdiction over tobacco and peanut subsi-
dies and who aspires to be Speaker of the House.10 
In addition to incumbent protection, mapmakers also have the 
overall partisan makeup of the delegation to consider. 11 Every decen-
nial census indicates that the Democratic Party's traditional hold on 
North Carolina's voters is eroding. As recently as 1960, Democratic 
candidates for Congress in North Carolina outpolled Republicans by a 
6. The statute allows a defendant to choose between preclearance by the Justice Department 
and a declaratory judgment in federal district court. The difference is meant to be procedural, 
not substantive: "[T]he Attorney General shall make the same determination that would be 
made by the court in an action for a declaratory judgment under section 5 .... " 28 C.F.R. 
§ 51.52(a) (1992). 
7. Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991); City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 
462 (1987). 
8. 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
9. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973), indicates that it is permissible for the state to 
take the protection of incumbents into account in mapmaking. See also Burns v. Richardson, 
384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966). However, Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 
(N.D. Ill. 1982), citing and relying on those cases, adds an important qualification: although 
protection of incumbents is an otherwise permissible criterion for districtmakers to consider, it 
may not be used when it adversely affects the interests of racial minorities. 574 F. Supp. at 1104, 
1109-10. 
10. See Al Kamen, Jumping the Gun on Speakership, WASH. POST, July 14, 1993, at Al9. 
Republican incumbents with a taste for safe seats were also complicit. See John Hood, Republi-
can Quota Fiasco, REASON, Nov. 1993, at 51. 
11. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), holds that districters may draw boundaries 
in such a way that the resulting map probably will reflect the statewide popular strength of the 
principal political parties. 412 U.S. at 751-54. 
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wide margin and held eleven of the state's twelve seats in the House of 
Representatives; in 1970, the Democrats still led by fifty-three to forty-
seven percent and held seven of eleven seats. 12 By 1992, Republican 
vote totals had almost matched those of the Democrats: out of 2.48 
million votes cast for congressional candidates, Democratic votes sur-
passed Republican by only about three percentage points. 13 Yet, in 
the end, the state's delegation of twelve was Democratic by an eight-
to-four margin. 14 This result partly reflects one of the properties of 
the single-member district with plurality voting rules (SMDPV), as 
will be discussed below. 15 But one can infer that a certain amount of 
artifice has entered into the outcome; North Carolina seems to have 
gerrymandered its districts a little. 
In the discussion that follows, we focus on the case of congres-
sional districting rather than on districting in general. Although we 
proceed in this manner for the sake of clarity, it is also true that no 
single, all-purpose normative theory of electoral mechanics will cover 
every case of democratic representation, from county commissions to 
mosquito control districts to sovereign legislatures. We do not claim 
that one can generalize our argument to every sort of election to which 
the VRA might apply. Yet we think our argument does approximate 
a theory of general application. 
The Shaw decision is nebulous and fits uncomfortably into the 
Supreme Court's VRA jurisprudence. It raises new problems rather 
than working with the ones already in play. Most puzzling is how 
Shaw treats the current constitutional status of "compactness" as a 
principle of districtmaking. On the one hand, the Court says that 
compactness is not constitutionally mandated; 16 on the other hand, it 
says that North Carolina's Twelfth District was simply too ugly to be 
legal. 17 Why? What did the North Carolina defendants do wrong? If 
racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional, where does that leave stat-
utes like the VRA, which courts and commentators have always as-
sumed to entail race-conscious districtmaking? 
Shaw addresses a fundamental problem of representative democ-
racy - namely, how far a legislature may go in controlling who is 
elected to it. In some respects, this question is the most fundamental 
that we can ask in our constitutional system. The compactness of dis-
tricts is pertinent to this inquiry. We argue that compactness in some 
12. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY's GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 999, 1024·25 (2d ed. 
1985). 
13. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
1994, at 938, 946-70. 
14. See id. at 946-70. 
IS. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
16. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993). 
17. Cf 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20. 
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sense is ordinarily a property of single-member territorial districts. 
We offer a proof that gerrymandering - whether it is conducted 
under the auspices of the VRA or is freelance legislative tinkering -
can spoil the game for representation by single-member district. In 
order to avoid that destiny, an antigerrymandering principle must be 
defined and administered outside normal political channels. 
I. THE GENESIS OF SHAW 
In the beginning, the Voting Rights Act was simple enough. Acts 
that were prohibited - that is, impediments to the exercise of the 
franchise such as poll taxes, chicanery by vote registrars, obstructing 
polling places, and the like - and the reasons Congress prohibited 
these obstacles were well understood by everyone connected with the 
election process. is 
After the Supreme Court decided Mobile v. Bolden 19 in 1980, how-
ever, matters took an esoteric tum. Bolden involved the at-large elec-
tion of city commissioners. The African-American plaintiffs 
complained that this procedure deprived them of Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment rights because it led to a situation in which a 
simple majority (fifty percent plus one) could win one hundred percent 
of the seats. The justiciability of this sort of vote-dilution claim had 
been recognized in prior Supreme Court cases.2° Following the rule of 
Washington v. Davis, 21 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 22 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 23 the 
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must show purposeful discrimina-
tion to state a cause of action. However, proving the state of mind of 
wary public officials, even ones who were acting in bad faith, would 
not be easy. Shortly after Bolden, therefore, Congress amended the 
VRA to give Bolden-type plaintiffs relief that the Constitution, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, would not give them. The VRA 
amendments protected minority voters' "opportunity . . . to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice. "24 A violation exists if the participation-election opportunities 
of voters in the protected class are less than those of other voters. 
18. See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 11-30 (1987). Moreover, the 
removal of these impediments sparked a dramatic increase in registration and voting by black 
citizens. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992). 
19. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
20. The jurisprudence of vote dilution was developed in response to the particular practice of 
holding at-large, multimember elections. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
21. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
22. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
23. 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979). 
24. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971), provided the language used in the statute. 
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Courts relieve plaintiffs hoping to make such a showing of the obliga-
tion to prove intentionally discriminatory acts. 
Amended section 2 charted a new course for voting-rights law not 
only because it established a new cause of action for plaintiffs, but 
because section 2 constitutes one of the section 5 preclearance criteria 
that the Attorney General employs in cases like Shaw. 25 In order to 
understand section 5, therefore, it is first necessary to understand sec-
tion 2, a difficult task. The legislative history of the 1982 amendments 
is filled, as Professor Issacharoff has noticed,26 with obviously strategic 
talk and rejoinder designed to influence the spin that courts would put 
on the legislation. But a problem remains at the heart of the statute 
that partisan infusions in legislative history can do little to fix. The 
statute is paradoxical in that it seems to mean two conflicting things at 
once. 
In amending section 2, it seems that Congress proposed to abate 
Bolden and to resurrect the standard in White v. Regester, 27 which 
propounded a "totality of circumstances" methodology for determin-
ing when the denial of a section 2 "opportunity to participate and to 
elect" had occurred.28 This standard later appeared in the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee's Majority Report.29 What, then, does section 2 
mean by "opportunity to participate and to elect," over and above 
freely voting and having one's votes honestly counted? 
The answer to this question, such as it is, appears in the Supreme 
25. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.SS(a), 51.59 (1992). 
26. Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 1847; cf Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-46 & n.9 
(1986) (discussing the legislative history of§ 2); 478 U.S. at 96-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Sen. Dole). 
27. 412 U.S. 755 (1973); see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en 
bane), affd. sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
28. Depending upon how one counts, the Majority Report put forward seven, eight, or nine 
factors: (1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision 
that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to 
participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state 
or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivi-
sion has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle-shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination against the minority group; (4) ifthere is a candidate slating process, whether the 
members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which 
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimina-
tion in such areas as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by 
overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been 
elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) whether there is a significant Jack of responsiveness 
on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; 
and (9) whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting quali-
fication, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. S. REP. No. 417, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07 [hereinafter SEN-
ATE REPORT]. 
29. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 28-29. 
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Court's decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. 30 The "opportunity to par-
ticipate and to elect"31 means not to have one's vote "diluted."32 But 
dilution is neither a statutory nor intuitive term. When does dilution 
take place? Dilution occurs when an electoral structure "submerges" 
a protected minority.33 What does the term submergence mean?34 
Gingles sets forth a three-prong test for determining when a statutory 
violation has occurred: 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district .... Second, the minority group must be able to 
show that it is politically cohesive .... Third, the minority must be able 
to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to en-
able it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.35 
The right to be un-"submerged" is the vindication that the statute 
promises. And therein lies the paradox, for the amendments also note 
that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population."36 But unsubmergence that entails a minority's right to 
an electoral structure that will deliver its "preferred candidate" is se-
mantically equivalent to a right to be represented separately and dis-
tinctly "in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." This 
is an extraordinary convolution. 37 How did it occur? 
30. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
31. 478 U.S. at 34. 
32. 478 U.S. at 46-51. 
33. See 478 U.S. at 46. 
34. The following passage in Gingles illustrates the idea: "Appellees contend that the legisla-
tive decision to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested juris-
dictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing their ability 
to elect representatives of their choice." 478 U.S. at 46 (footnotes omitted). 
35. 478 U.S. at 50-51. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). 
37. It is also, we think, an unnecessary one. Although it is beside the present point, we think 
there is a relatively obvious escape from the paradox. We are persuaded by Abigail Themstrom's 
argument that some sort of intent standard surely survives in § 2, even if it is not the sort of 
specific intent that the Constitution normally requires. See THERNSTROM, supra note 18, at 195; 
see also Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (noting that, for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes, "'[d]iscriminatory purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or 
intent as awareness of consequences .... It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group"). The totality-of-the-circumstances test is adaptable 
to limiting remedies to occasions when it appears that racially discriminatory acts have probably 
occurred. It is a tool for recognizing the existence of discriminatory intent. Thus the factors that 
the Senate Report found relevant to a violation look to "any history of official discrimination"; 
whether the state has "used unusually large election districts ... or other voting practices or 
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination"; whether "the members of [a] 
minority group have been denied access" to a candidate slating process; the extent to which 
minorities "bear the effects of discrimination" in other areas of life; whether "campaigns have 
been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals"; and whether the policy underlying the use 
of a particular electoral practice "is tenuous." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28. 
A finding that a policy underlying an electoral practice "is tenuous" implies that the policy is 
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This paradox arose because those members of Congress who 
wanted proportional representation for racial minorities did not have 
the votes to make the change in the law they preferred, while those 
who were satisfied with the outcome in Bolden did not have the votes 
to protect the status quo they preferred.38 The result is an amended 
section 2 whose parts seem to conflict. 
The plurality in Gingles effectively resolved this tension by decid-
ing that the VRA established a limited right on behalf of minorities to 
some measure of proportional representation. The Justices did not 
come right out and say this, but, tracking through their analysis of 
how racially polarized voting is supposed to be proved, it is hard to 
avoid the inference that this is what they meant. The Gingles plaintiffs 
had proffered evidence that showed a relationship between the race of 
the voters and the candidates for whom they voted. The plaintiffs re-
lied on this so-called bivariate correlation to support the inference of 
racial bloc voting. The statistical axiom that a bivariate correlation 
does not show that those variables are dependent on one another39 was 
not taken to matter. The North Carolina defendants thus argued that 
the plaintiffs' bivariate analysis was inadequate as a matter of law be-
cause it did not establish that race was the cause of bloc voting. The 
defendants suggested that a plaintiff's proof required a more sophisti-
cated and complex analysis involving multiple variables. Only this 
kind of analysis could yield a sound inferential basis for establishing 
whether racial bloc voting was the result of racial prejudice. The plu-
rality rejected this approach because, as it stressed, Congress's purpose 
in amending section 2 was to do away with the need to show discrimi-
natory intent. Thus, with respect to a violation under section 2, "the 
legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causa-
tion nor intent."40 
It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites - not 
the reasons for that difference - that results in blacks having less oppor-
tunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives. Consequently, 
we conclude that under the "results test" of § 2, only the correlation 
between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes 
of the correlation, matters.41 
By this reasoning, a violation might exist when there is racial di-
pretext. The use of an "unusually large" district that "enhances the opportunity to discriminate" 
implicates intent. To deny someone access to a slating process is an intentional act. All these 
matters notice the parochialism and prejudice of state or community actors - in short, they tell 
us when it is reasonable to infer that intentional discrimination may have decisively influenced an 
election. 
38. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 194; THERNSTROM, supra note 18, at 134·36. 
39. For example, if one detects a statistical correlation between diagnoses of heart disease 
and of cataracts, this correlation would not warrant the inference that cataracts cause heart 
disease or vice versa. 
40. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62 {1986). 
41. 478 U.S. at 63. 
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vergence in voting patterns, whether this divergence is attributable to 
racial prejudice, to accident, or to noninvidious differences in political 
perspective that may sometimes sort along racial lines. The plurality 
recognized that such divergence may be attributable to the differing 
political agendas favored by a white majority and a black minority but 
argued that, under section 2, this should make no difference to 
whether there was a violation.42 As a consequence, "racial bloc voting 
that dilutes minority votes" can be found whenever majority voters 
reject a candidate preferred by minority voters, even though that rejec-
tion may have more to do with that candidate's views on health care 
or tax policy or defense research than with his race. 
The Gingles plurality infuses the VRA with a bias toward propor-
tional representation because state legislatures that wish to follow the 
precept of the plurality can realistically conclude that they have a duty 
to alter any electoral system in which racial bloc voting has prevented 
proportional racial representation. A cause of action appears to exist 
whenever a plaintiff can argue that proportional representation could 
have been achieved, but was not. 
The possibility of proportional racial representation, in other 
words, establishes the necessity of proportional racial representation. 
As Judge Phillips recently noted, 
[a] unique, critical feature of contemporary group vote-dilution jurispru-
dence [is that a] violation can only be determined by identifying electoral 
districts which would not violate the group's voting rights because in 
those districts they would constitute effective voting majorities. A state's 
failure so to have districted thus constitutes the violation, and the appro-
priate remedy is a requirement that it now do so. In this somewhat unu-
sual decisional process, the availability of remedy thus effectively 
determines the existence of right - and its violation.43 
The final judicial event on the road to Shaw v. Reno was the appli-
cation of Gingles to single-member districts, a step taken by the 
Supreme Court in Growe v. Emison. 44 There is some irony here; in the 
early VRA cases, single-member districts were regarded as the pre-
ferred remedy for successful claims of vote dilution in at-large, multi-
member districts. It now appears that single-member districts that 
"submerge" minorities - in other words, in which the minority is a 
minority - are similarly subject to vote-dilution claims, with the pre-
ferred remedy being the substitution of a different single-member dis-
trict in which the minorities are "unsubmerged" - which is to say, in 
the majority.45 
42. 478 U.S. at 64-65. 
43. Republican Party v. Hunt, 991 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1993) (Phillips, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en bane). 
44. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). 
45. The application of Gingles to single-member districts is an especially perplexing develop-
ment given the nature of such districts. Single-member districts can be gerrymandered, with one 
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The Gingles court reserved the question of how to apply the VRA 
to single-member districts,46 but it seems unlikely that the complexi-
ties of doing so were fully appreciated at that time. In the context of 
single-member districts, Gingles' first prong - the requirement of a 
geographically compact minority - proved to be something of a time 
bomb, which went off in Shaw. The question is how one tells when a 
protected minority is "sufficiently ... geographically compact to con-
stitute a majority in a single-member district."47 The Court did not 
suggest a particular criterion of compactness in Gingles, and, as the 
mapmakers in North Carolina knew, any group of voters - no matter 
where they live in a state - can be fit into the same contiguous dis-
trict. As we have explained elsewhere, 
for any spatial arrangement of voters, a scheme of contiguous districts 
can be constructed such that each district contains only those voters that 
have been specified in advance, regardless of where they live. 
If every name in the Manhattan phone book is randomly associated 
with one of ten districts, a map can be constructed that will place every 
voter in a literally contiguous district no matter which combination of 
names and districts are chosen. The resulting district map would cer-
tainly look odd - in places, districts might be stretched thin as tele-
phone wires - but it can be done, regardless of where the voters live.48 
Unless one assumes some concept of compactness, the requirement 
that there exist a territorial district in which a racial minority group 
could constitute an electoral majority boils down to a question of mi-
nority group numbers alone. A VRA violation would occur if there 
are a district's worth of minority citizens scattered anywhere in the 
state, provided white and black voters consistently demonstrated di-
vergent voting patterns. As a matter of congressional intent and prac-
tical public administration, this condition seems rather a rarefied basis 
upon which to found a statutory violation. The problem emerged in 
Shaw v. Reno, 49 in which the appellees redrew the congressional dis-
trict map to satisfy the preclearance procedures of section 5. The 
Department of Justice had discerned the existence of enough black 
voters sufficiently geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district. The resulting district, the Twelfth, proves the 
of two potentially objectionable results: either minority voters can be overconcentrated as part of 
a gerrymander designed to minimize the total number of minority representatives, or minorities 
can be overly divided in a manner that contravenes the requirements of the VRA. See generally 
Kathcyn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 464-71 (1988). 
46. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.12. 
47. 478 U.S. at 50. 
48. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Proce-
dural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 301, 331 (1991) 
(footnote omitted). 
49. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
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Attorney General's point. But it is very, very ugly.50 
The plaintiffs made no representation concerning their race and 
did not press a claim based upon the dilution of white voting strength. 
Rather, they alleged "that the deliberate segregation of voters into sep-
arate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to 
participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process."51 The court rejected 
the notion that the Constitution guarantees any such right and recast 
plaintiff's allegations: "What appellants object to is redistricting legis-
lation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be 
viewed only as an effort to segregate races for the purpose of voting 
•••• "
52 Thus reframed, said the Court, this allegation states an equal 
protection claim because the North Carolina plan was manifestly in-
tended as a race-based classification of voters. Accordingly, the plan 
must survive strict scrutiny - that is, it must be "narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest." The Court remanded to give the 
district court an opportunity to find what compelling state interest the 
plan was narrowly tailored to achieve. 
The majority's assignment of the burden of proof may at first seem 
puzzling. As the dissenters pointed out, Fourteenth Amendment cases 
addressing group voting rights had always required "a showing that 
'the political processes ... were not equally open to participation by 
the group in question - that its members had less opportunity than 
did other residents in the district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.' " 53 The majority's 
approach apparently releases plaintiffs from this burdensome require-
ment and places an equally burdensome requirement on the state to 
prove that its actions are justified by a compelling interest. The criti-
cal move in the Shaw majority's opinion is the assertion that the dis-
tricting statute was an overt racial classification, and, as such, subject 
to strict scrutiny. To be sure, no "racial classification appears on the 
face of the statute.''54 Yet the Shaw court protested that the North 
Carolina districting plan was one of a class of admittedly " 'rare' stat-
utes that, although race-neutral, are on their face, 'unexplainable on 
50. For a map of the Twelfth District, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive 
Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After 
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 492 (1993). As measured under the standard of compact-
ness discussed in Polsby & Popper, supra note 48, at 348-51, the Twelfth District of North Caro-
lina scores 1.4 points when 100 is the maximum. Pace Justice Souter's assertion to the contrary 
in his dissent in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2848, several congressional districts drawn to comply with 
the VRA have even worse scores. Florida's Third District is much worse - it scores 1.03. To 
give an idea of the compactness .characteristics of the Twelfth District, it is as uncompact as the 
silhouette of a strand of rope one inch thick and eight feet long. 
51. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
52. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
53. 113 S. Ct. at 2835 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1972)). 
54. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
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grounds other than race' "55 - linguistically neutral, that is, but un-
mistakably race based nonetheless. There can be little justification for 
exempting manifestly race-based classifications from the usual justify-
ing protocols when, as the Shaw court appreciated, "a reapportion-
ment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally 
cannot be understood as anything other than" an explicit racial 
classification. 56 
The justification that the Court gives for its decision in Shaw im-
plies that an insecure foundation upholds the entire structure of the 
vote-dilution jurisprudence that has developed around the Voting 
Rights Act, at least as applied to single-member districts. North 
Carolina drew its district map in order to comply with the require-
ments of section 5 of the VRA. One would ordinarily think it a "com-
pelling" interest for the state, which was a member of the Confederacy 
and has a long and notorious history of de jure segregation by race, to 
attempt in good faith to conform with U.S. Department of Justice di-
rectives issued pursuant to a constitutionally valid civil rights law. 
But to this proposition, the Shaw court demurred: "States certainly 
have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws that are constitutionally valid . . . . But in the context of a 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the dif-
ference between what the law permits, and what it requires."57 Com-
pliance with the VRA, the Court suggests, did not require the creation 
of North Carolina's ugly Twelfth District. 
This explanation is unconvincing. If the VRA requires the crea-
tion of a second black district, then in creating that district the State of 
North Carolina must engage in an act of racial classification. This is 
true whether the resulting district is ugly or compactly drawn. If the 
constitutional infirmity of North Carolina's district map was the act of 
racial classification, and if North Carolina has no choice but to engage 
in such an act under a federal mandate, then something has to give. 
That something, one is bound to suspect, is the federal mandate, 
which must be constitutionally infirm, at least as applied. The Shaw 
court eluded this hard-to-doubt result, temporarily, by remanding, 
and this is the riddle that the undoubtedly bemused district judge must 
resolve. Sooner or later there will be a case with an irremediably ugly 
district map - that is, where no less-ugly map will bring about the 
desired racial result - whose only justification is compliance with the 
VRA. Then what? If the courts stay with the reasoning in Shaw, they 
will strike down that map. Much VRA jurisprudence will go down 
with it. 
55. 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
56. 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
57. 113 S. Ct. at 2830. 
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In the meantime, it seems that the one principle that a district 
court can take to the bank is that extraordinarily uncompact district 
maps are not to be tolerated, though professedly drawn in order to 
comply with the VRA. As the Court stated in Shaw, "we believe that 
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter."58 Yet 
the Court's concern was not with appearances per se. What the court 
was rejecting was the interpretation, as embodied by the Twelfth Dis-
trict, of Gingles' ugly idea of geographical compactness. 
Compactness, this interpretation insinuates, is territorial contiguity 
with the addition of the rather vague and, one is bound to suspect, 
meaningless criterion of "community of interest." What that chain of 
reasoning ultimately produces is the map in Shaw. As we show be-
low, 59 one can manufacture dramatically uglier maps utilizing the 
same procedure. So far, there has been little or no constitutional law 
on the question of how far a state may indulge a political mapmaker's 
panache. "Ugliness," it seems, is the provisional name given to the 
problem. It is an impulse in search of a theory. The theory follows. 
II. REPRESENTATION: THE MADISONIAN WAGER 
We leave it to others either to admonish the Supreme Court for 
ignoring the proportional representation proviso of amended section 2 
or to offer the acrobatic proof that, despite appearances, Gingles does 
not endorse a form of proportional representation. 60 Our burden in 
this Part is simply to persuade that proportional representation and 
representation by single-member districts are incompatible: choosing 
one system means rejecting the other. 
Both proportional representation and representation by single-
member districts have many possible variants, some more familiar 
than others, and all have both philosophical and practical advantages 
and disadvantages. We assume without discussion that the main vari-
eties of either form are agreeable, or can be massaged into agreement, 
with Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution - "The House of Repre-
sentatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by 
the People of the several States"61 - and that therefore the choices 
among systems will be driven primarily by arguments of prudence and 
policy and only secondarily by those of constitutional law. 
Single-member districts and proportional representation aim at 
58. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
59. See infra Part III. 
60. Any such argument will be wasted on us, however. We agree with what Justice 
O'Connor said in Thornburg v. Gingles: "[E]lectoral success has now emerged, under the Court's 
standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and ... create[s] an entitlement to roughly 
proportional representation .... " 478 U.S. 30, 93 (1986). Lani Guinier has made the same 
point. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of 
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991). 
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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mutually inconsistent objectives and present candidates for office with 
different, indeed essentially opposite, electoral incentives. Single-
member district systems favor candidates whose political "pitch" is 
near the center of the electorate's values. 62 The incentive of a candi-
date in a single-member district system is to cultivate a base of support 
that is broad rather than deep because a vote is a vote; intensity does 
not matter. In any multimember district, and especially under propor-
tional representation, the dominant strategy for a candidate is to be 
the first preference of an electoral fraction large enough to be entitled 
to a legislative seat. 
The most familiar form to Americans is single-member districts 
with plurality voting. The chief liability of this system is not its well-
advertised tendency to shortchange persons and interests on the mar-
gins of political life. Arguably, this tendency is as much a strength of 
the method as it is a weakness. The worst problem of the single-mem-
ber district system is that, without proper safeguards, it can be sub-
verted by partisan gerrymandering63 - the most-studied genus of 
"vote dilution." 
Until the past twenty or thirty years, the problem of partisan ger-
rymandering had been more serious in theory than in reality. Draw-
ing a partisan gerrymander freehand is difficult to do successfully, and 
there are many examples of botched jobs that not only have not had 
their intended effect, but have backfired.64 In the twenty-first century, 
when the next redistricting will take place, things will be different. 
New computers, better market research, and more widely available 
databases will change the playing field. The American political system 
is at a fork in the road, and it will have to choose between explicitly 
recognizing some kind of antigerrymandering principle or moving 
away from the single-member district system as its dominant represen-
tational form. 
Perhaps we should simply jettison the single-member system. A 
number of scholars are skeptical as to whether single-member districts 
adequately "represent" their constituents.65 The Supreme Court has 
62. Eli Noam used the term pitch to describe how different kinds of television programming 
address their audience. Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of Broadcasting, 55 
Pus. CHOICE 163, 165 (1987). Pitch defines all of the matters a candidate puts forth, intention-
ally or unintentionally, that will affect electoral success. For example, issues, character, personal 
competence, party identification, personal history, and likability are all important ingredients of 
a candidate's political pitch. 
63. See REIN TAAGEPERA & MATIHEW s. SHUGART, SEATS AND VOTES 233 (1989). 
64. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regu-
lation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1341-45 (1987); cj Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Com-
plex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grof man, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 213, 225-26 (1985). 
65. For that matter, maybe representative democracy itself has outlived its usefulness. The 
"technological infeasibility" objection to direct democracy is gone, and a brave new world 
awaits. See Brian Beedham, A Better Way To Vote, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11-17, 1993, at 5. 
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recently acknowledged the applicability of the VRA to single-member 
districts66 and may, at some point, see fit to herald a new democratic 
paradigm. Short of a paradigm shift, however, the terms of the argu-
ment leave a familiar choice: single-member districts, at-large elec-
tions, or some form of proportional representation. The skirmishing 
among these options is a very old and polemical pastime, which has 
been well described by Rein 'J;'aagepera, Matthew Shugart, and many 
others.67 
The chief advantage of proportional representation systems is that 
they allow voters a chance to elect representatives whose pitch is in the 
voters' own strike zone. Proportional representation voters less often 
endure the distasteful business of going through life pulling levers for 
lesser evils. Every pitch with appreciable electoral support is entitled 
to its share of the legislative bully pulpit. Proponents of this system -
many of whom, one suspects, never do find a candidate for an impor-
tant office whose pitch they really like - see many advantages in it: 
proportional representation emphasizes political differences and hence 
may serve to sharpen legislative debate and clarify what eventually is 
decided. 68 Many points of view get a seat at the table to engage in 
dialogic republicanism in order to hammer out the stuff of which our 
public life in common will be made. 69 Best of all, the system enhances 
regime legitimacy because interests that have been marginalized or ex-
cluded for discreditable reasons, such as racial prejudice, are at last 
given sanction to speak. 10 
On the other hand, proportional representation makes it more 
likely that deputies from the one-issue outskirts of political life will fill 
the legislatures. It may be quite a challenge for those dissentient rep-
resentatives to create and implement a common agenda of governance. 
The risks are greater than with a single-member system that the legis-
lative program will disintegrate into a cafeteria-style hodgepodge of 
concessions to the various factions that make up the governing coali-
tion, any of which measures might prove obnoxious to the great ma-
66. See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). 
67. See TAAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra note 63, at 47-57. An excellent discussion also ap-
pears in Mary A. Inman, Comment, CP.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Re-
suscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991 (1993). See also ROBERT G. 
DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 
(1968); Maurice Duverger, Which Is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 31, 34 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984); 
John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE 
L.J. 163 (1984). 
68. See generally the discussion in Duverger, supra note 67, and in Ferdinand A. Hermens, 
Representation and Proportional Representation, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES 
AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 67. 
69. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29 (1985). 
70. See Guinier, supra note 60, at 1134-53. 
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jority of voters. For that matter, as in the case of the Fourth French 
Republic, proportional representation systems might not be able to 
find a common thread and so would regress to institutional incompe-
tence. Legislative paralysis is an altogether defensible result in the ab-
sence of adequate representational consensus. In any case, this 
experience is more of a risk in a proportional representation world. 71 
Single-member district systems move the republican dialogue out 
of the legislative chamber and into the streets of the district. The sin-
gle-member district candidate's incentive to pitch to the largest faction 
of probable voters ordinarily translates into an exercise in electoral 
coalition building within the district. Single-member district systems 
are comprised of members whose incentives are to build election and 
reelection coalitions for themselves, 72 and who had better not be too 
closely connected to controversy. Coalition building in the streets 
among factions in the community is probably easier than coalition 
building in the legislature among deputies of different parties. Voters 
will take much more for granted about what a candidate is likely to 
do, will tend to extract fewer specific promises, and will leave a candi-
date more wiggle room in comparison with the deputy's legislative col-
leagues. Hence single-member districts tend to a politics of mushiness 
in contrast to the hard, gemlike flame of legislatures comprised of 
members with sharply differentiated pitches. 
Which system is preferable on democratic principles? Of course 
there is no unique answer; everything depends upon what one is trying 
to do. Proportional representation is attractive to those who attach 
primary importance to what Professor Hanna Pitkin calls "descriptive 
representation."73 John Adams thought legislatures should be "an ex-
act portrait, in miniature, of the people at large."74 On this theory, the 
purpose of democracy is to be democratic, and representational forms 
are allowed as a concession to the practical reality that direct democ-
racy is too unwieldy to function. Proportional representation pre-
serves and translates the pluralism of the electorate into the legislative 
chamber. Advocates of fringe positions - Libertarians or Socialists 
or religious parties - might also prefer proportional representation75 
if they seek to have members of their own faction in the legislature 
rather than some degree of influence under the big tent of one of two 
grand coalition parties. 
71. See generally LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 315-
40 (1967). 
72. See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DIS· 
TRICTS (1978). 
73. HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967), 
74. Letter from John Adams to John Penn (Jan. 1776), in IV WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 203, 
205 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). 
75. Cf Akhil R. Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283 
(1984). 
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A single-member district system is generally defended on practical 
grounds76 because it tends to produce stronger, more decisive govem-
ments.77 We think that this defense of the single-member district sys-
tem is unnecessarily apologetic for two reasons. First, the ability of 
proportional representation to deliver sharply defined issues can easily 
be overstated. It is true that candidates for office will have an incen-
tive to differentiate their products, but, corresponding to the informa-
tion one gains about the sympathies and intellectual commitments of 
candidates, one loses information in a proportional representation sys-
tem about the relationship between voting on the one hand, and what 
sort of government one can expect eventually to emerge from the elec-
toral process on the other. As Professor Douglas Rae suggested, 
"[t]he election itself comes to a very partial arbitration of the question 
'Who governs?' " 78 Because the SMDPV form tends to lead to a two-
party equilibrium no matter how many issue dimensions are in play, 79 
elections in this system have a governance transparency advantage 
over proportional representation. For example, American voters 
know that, by tendency, there is a difference between Republican and 
Democratic candidates in terms of what interest groups support them 
and what laws of social cause and effect they will bring to bear on the 
issues of the day. These differences should in tum lead predictably to 
differences, if not necessarily large ones, in agendas, priorities, and be-
havior in office. A voter is thus in a position to register a conviction 
on these matters by deciding which lever to pull. In proportional rep-
resentation systems, however, as Rae has noticed, the ultimate 
makeup of the governing coalition "is a choice bounded but left unde-
cided by the election outcome . . . . [T]his surely raises important 
difficulties for theories of electoral representation, for it is impossible 
to see how the citizen could draw useful associations between his vot-
ing decision and the eventual choice of a govemment."80 There seems 
to be a sort of Heisenbergian principle at work; while the views of the 
candidates in a proportional representation system are likely to be 
sharper - and the more proportional the system the more sharply 
differentiated their views are apt to become - the identity of the coali-
tion that will eventually come to power is correspondingly harder to 
foresee and becomes progressively harder as proportionality 
76. Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society?, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 261, 263 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); Schuck, supra note 64, at 1359-61. 
77. See Schuck, supra note 64, at 1361. 
78. DOUGLAS w. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 173 (rev. ed. 
1971). 
79. See TAAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra note 63, at 39-41 (illustrating the tendency of an 
SMDPV system to produce a two-party system by analyzing the history of political parties in 
New Zealand); cf. id. at 112-16 (number of seats per district is an important factor in determining 
the number of effective political parties). 
80. RAE, supra note 78, at 173. 
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increases. 81 
A second argument for SMDPV taps a more fundamental political 
norm. The dominant strain of American constitutional thought re-
jects the premise that the purpose of democracy is to be democratic. 
Democracy, and government itself, are mere vehicles for more impor-
tant matters. Governments are not instituted in order to represent 
people, but rather to secure rights. 82 Democracy's special claim is that 
it furthers this objective better than other forms of government, at 
least if its constitution can contain and incapacitate the destructive 
influence of factions. Madison's scheme for accomplishing this objec-
tive, usually called the Republican Principle, was put forth in The Fed-
eralist Nos. 10 and 51.83 Robert A. Dahl characterized the point thus: 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, it can be controlled by the 
operation of "the republican principle" of voting in the legislative body, 
i.e., the majority can vote down the minority . 
. . . The development of majority faction can be limited if the electo-
rate is numerous, extended, and diverse in interests. 84 
Disabling factions, not empowering them, lay at the heart of 
Madison's constitutional idea. The single-member district scheme car-
ries this project forward by forcing ideological compromise on those 
who hope to be influential within the system. The single-member dis-
trict system accepts what might be called the Madisonian Wager -
that the compromise policies that emerge from a system that rewards 
"center" candidates and ignores the fringes will in the long run be 
more respectful of the rights and liberties of the people than will those 
compromises that emerge from a system in which faction is allowed its 
full, vigorous, and in some ways satisfying play. The Madisonian 
Wager is, in effect, a form of poker in which each player must discard 
his strongest cards - his one-issue preferences - before starting to 
bet. 
The psychological assumption that lies at the heart of the 
Madisonian Wager is that many people hold unusual views about 
something of potential electoral moment. Although the world is com-
posed of people whose sensibilities on average are average, the sensibil-
ities of most average people are not average with respect to everything. 
The most egregious quirks and potential "one-issue" enthusiasms are 
cultivated, proverbially so, by people who appear in other respects to 
be quite ordinary. The avowed mission of proportional representation 
is electoral disaggregation - getting people to think of themselves in 
81. See EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 315-40. See generally RAE, supra note 78, at 87-103. 
82. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. l (U.S. 1776). See generally Wilson c. 
McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Represemation and Party, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 12 (1989). 
83. See Hermens, supra note 68, at 16-17. 
84. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 27 (1956); see also 
McWilliams, supra note 82. 
December 1993] Ugly 669 
terms of their differences instead of their commonalities. Proportional 
representation thus encourages electoral disaggregation by making it 
more valuable in the political marketplace. 
The incentive to go for broad, shallow support is not the only char-
acteristic of the single-member district system that rankles minority 
interests. As is well known, the single-member district system awards 
an electoral bonus to a party that polls a majority of voters across a 
state in excess of that party's actual strength among voters. This ten-
dency is sometimes called the "cube law," a reference to the exponent 
in a formula relating vote totals and electoral outcomes. 85 By this the-
ory, majority dominance of the legislative chamber in a single-member 
district system increases with the cube of its vote totals. Hence, a nar-
row electoral majority for one party usually results in its comfortably 
controlling the legislature, and a clear electoral victory translates into 
a landslide in the legislative chamber. 
Scholars have challenged the theoretical details of the cube law; 
they have proposed other formulae that better reflect the inflationary 
effect of single-member district schemes. 86 That there is such an infla-
tionary effect is beyond dispute as an empirical matter. Furthermore, 
the likely cause of this bonus seems apparent. 87 The ratios of minority 
to majority votes in the districts that make up a given state will vary 
from that same ratio for the entire state. In some districts the ratio 
will be closer, and in others greater, than in the state as a whole. As-
suming that the district-to-district variance is random, in any particu-
lar district the majority can fall below its statewide performance and 
still obtain the simple majority it needs to win. The minority, on the 
other hand, will only carry those districts where its support is greater 
than its statewide average by enough to give it a simple majority there. 
Because this is statistically less likely to occur, the majority wins seats 
in somewhat greater proportion than its votes even in a scrupulously 
fair election, and, the greater the majority, the greater the bonus. 
Professors Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart convincingly 
demonstrate that vote inflation is a real-world attribute of all electoral 
systems, including proportional systems. 88 Almost invariably, the 
losers are the smallest parties, and the winners are the largest parties; 
proportionality is determined chiefly by the number of representatives 
85. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, For Single-Member Districts Random Is Not Equal, in REP-
RESENTATION AND REDISfRICTING ISSUES IN THE 1980s, at 55 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 
1982). 
86. See TAAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra note 63, at 184-98; Edward R. Tufte, The Relation-
ship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 540 (1973). 
87. Cf. Tufte, supra note 86, at 545 (disputing "that there actually is a theory behind the cube 
law") (emphasis omitted). 
88. See generally TAAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra note 63. The foundational discussion of 
this proposition is found in RAE, supra note 78, at 69. 
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that are to be elected in each district. 89 Beyond these attributes, how-
ever, proportional representation systems differ widely in how propor-
tionally they represent. 
Regardless of the relative merits or disadvantages of the single-
member district system, the Madisonian Wager and the concomitant 
bonus for whatever party is in the majority has indelibly marked the 
practice of American politics. Our political parties hover around an 
ideological center, and observers who hail from countries with sharply 
defined political parties may well wonder whether there is any real 
difference between them. Candidates for Congress shy away from 
strong measures on ideologically charged issues if they can, and they 
often find ways to move "hot button" matters to courts, base-closing 
commissions, or other agencies for whose decisions they cannot be 
blamed. If these system flaccidities are exasperating, they have a com-
pensating attribute. Extremism is notably absent. 
The important point to grasp is that the decision between single-
member district and proportional representation systems is genuinely 
a choice. The two are philosophically and practically different. As 
Taagepera and Shugart note, "you cannot have your cake and eat it 
too: sociopolitical gerrymander in single-seat districts is not a feasible 
way to increase proportional representation of whatever group."90 
Proportional representation ultimately requires multiseat districts, 
which will eventually tend to produce a multiparty system.91 At-
tempting to create a system of proportional representation in the con-
text of a two-party, single-member system is not realistic. It is also 
unrealistic to take away a considerable fraction of the whole and try to 
represent that part proportionally, without expecting the political 
character of the minuend to change as well. 
The system created under the VRA is neither fish nor fowl. It is 
not SMDPV; a "fix" has been added that increases the probability that 
racial minorities, if they are large enough, will be proportionately rep-
resented. Nor is it a system of proportional representation. One of the 
characteristics of proportional representation systems, and arguably 
that with the greatest normative appeal, is that the proliferation of 
parties is unregulated. Any contender is free to define itself in terms of 
89. RAE, supra note 78, at 69, 112. 
90. T AAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra note 63, at 233. They also write: 
It is hard enough to delineate single-seat districts which are politically neutral, but the 
United States lately has engaged in attempts at "constructive gerrymander" to make some 
districts ethnically non-random so that minorities could gain some representation. What 
this means is that some sort of PR is sought within the framework of single-seat districts, 
and this is a contradiction in terms. Multi-seat districts are unavoidable, if one desires some 
resemblance to proportionality .... [I]f one [desires] some sort of sociopolitical PR, one 
should give up the hope of achieving it within the scope of single-seat districts, short of a 
segregational busing of voters to proper ethnic districts. PR requires multi-seat districts. 
Id. 
91. This might be called Duverger's Law. See the discussion in id. at 233. 
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its own choosing. It may follow along some conventional sociopoliti-
cal category - Christian democrat, socialist, labor - or it may find 
some cross-cutting theme- the environment, immigration, "change." 
The combinations and marketing opportunities are theoretically 
boundless; the limiting factor is simply whether the public finds the 
combination of positions attractive enough to vote for it. The voters 
themselves choose the issue dimensions that will eventually get to be 
represented. 92 
When the government preselects the operative issue dimensions, it 
creates a defective hybrid. It preserves the single-member district 
form, but with an extra chromosome, so to speak. Specially created 
districts are designed to lack an element that conventional single-
member districts ordinarily possess. The crux of the difference is that 
conventional single-member districts have the Madisonian "centering" 
property: single-member districts with preselected issue dimensions 
are meant not to have this property. If the preselected issue dimension 
is race, incentives to "move toward the center" with respect to that 
dimension are lost. 
In this respect, the VRA creates an entitlement that may be said to 
benefit a certain kind of political agenda - one that is freed from the 
moderating pressures that the system normally bolsters. As a result, 
the most strongly ideologically committed members of the privileged 
faction become its most influential, inframarginal core instead of being 
moved toward the margin, as the Madisonian Wager would ordain. 
No other interest groups are thus privileged, and the political game 
turns into one between those with incentives to accommodation and 
those with opposite incentives. 
In practice, this sort of system adapts itself to bringing forth au-
thentic representatives of the minority community only by the verbal 
trick of defining authenticity as counter-Madisonian racial politics. As 
the Supreme Court noted, a preselected racial issue dimension "rein-
forces the perception that members of the same racial group - regard-
less of their age, education, economic status, or the community in 
which they live - think alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls."93 The single-member 
district system, then, has a great deal to be said for it, but it does have 
an Achilles' heel. We will expound upon this theme in Part III. 
III. REPRESENTATION: THE CASE OF EAST GARDEN 
The Constitution provides few constraints upon how we elect 
members of the House of Representatives. For all the Constitution 
provides, any state might organize the election of its House delega-
92. The most authoritative recent discussion of issue dimensions is found in id. at 92-103. 
93. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993). 
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tions according to a mix of regional interests, occupational matters, or 
some sort of proportional representation by religion, race, gender, or 
ethnicity - or, for that matter, some combination of the forgoing. 
The principle of one person, one vote must be taken to have nar-
rowed the set of constitutional possibilities down to three: representa-
tion at large - for example, each elector may cast one vote in each of 
five distinct contests, and the five top vote getters will win; propor-
tional representation in multimember districts - for example, each 
elector may vote only once, and the top five vote getters win;94 or a 
version of representation by single-member district. 
A variant of the latter system is one in which contiguous tracts of 
real estate make up "districts." But one easily can conceive of nonter-
ritorial principles of organization which might be termed printout dis-
tricts. 95 A printout district is comprised of a list of voters regardless of 
where they reside in the state. The lists can be compiled according to 
any number of principles or by no principle - that is, randomly. 
Printout districts could represent people by ideology, by age cohorts, 
by occupations, by expressed affinity for hobbies, or by ways of life; 
people might be grouped by ascribed characteristics such as race, reli-
gion, or sex. The possibilities are endless. 
We now offer the example of the imaginary state of East Garden to 
establish that printout districts, if they no more than obey the princi-
ple of one person, one vote, will not do. We apologize in advance for 
the involved arithmetic that is necessary to demonstrate how to steal 
an election, but it seems to us a worthwhile exercise to go through if 
only to see how poorly the principle of one person, one vote serves as a 
bulwark against antidemocratic electoral practice.96 
East Garden has a population of 5,000,000 divided into ten con-
gressional districts. As in most of the larger American states, the two 
major parties have roughly equal statewide strength. In East Garden, 
the two major parties are the Standard Old Party and the Flat Earth-
Vegetarian.97 Assume that in average elections the turnout of voters is 
fifty percent of those eligible, and that these will divide equally for 
94. A version of this system - cumulative voting for members of the state House of Repre-
sentatives - was practiced in Illinois for 100 years until 1970, when the state's present constitu-
tion was adopted. For description and discussion, see GEORGE s. BLAIR, CUMULATIVE VOTING 
(1975); AUSTIN RANNEY, ILLINOIS POLITICS 20-22 (1960). Blair emphasizes that cumulative 
voting as a means of enhancing minority representation requires comparatively well-organized 
political parties. BLAIR, supra, at 63-86. An important general discussion of proportional repre-
sentation appears in Guinier, supra note 60, at 1136-53. 
95. For purposes of discussion, we conflate all of these variants into one. 
96. Professor Schuck has argued that hypotheticals of the sort that follows in the text lay out 
a pretty implausible scenario. See Schuck, supra note 64, at 1358. We consider Schuck's refuta· 
tion unpersuasive, see Polsby & Popper, supra note 48, at 325-26, but urge the reader to consider 
the argument carefully. 
97. We borrow these designations from Paul E. Meehl, The Selfish Voter Paradox and the 
Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 11 (1977). 
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S.O.P. and FE-V. If East Garden is like the United States as a whole, 
25.6% of its citizens - 1,280,000 persons - are under the age of 
eighteen98 and therefore cannot vote. Distribute these young citizens 
evenly in three districts - which, to simplify arithmetic in the next 
few paragraphs, we can treat as a single triple-sized district. In order 
to get up to the required number of persons in the districts (500,000 in 
each, multiplied by 3, equals 1,500,000), we must fill out the rolls with 
220,000 adults. If we choose eligible voters randomly, one should ex-
pect 110,000 of those 220,000 to vote - that is the assumption of fifty 
percent election turnout - of whom 55,000 would favor the S.O.P. 
and 55,000 the FE-V. In other words, if we chose the 220,000 ran-
domly, those three districts would be "toss-up" seats. 
Arranging toss-ups, however, is no way to steal an election -
which is, remember, what we are trying to do; we can assume we are 
doing it for the S.O.P. So we will not select our additional 220,000 
constituents randomly. We will first choose 60,000 highly motivated 
S.O.P. voters whom we can find easily with some commercially avail-
able databases and a Basic search program. Suppose certain kinds of 
consumption patterns indicate both a high probability of voting and 
strong S.O.P. identification; we could look for members of certain 
country clubs or subscribers to Blood Sport Digest. But why be cute? 
We can probably get most of our 60,000 from the S.O.P.'s own mem-
bership roster. 
We now need another 160,000 adults. If we acquire these by ran-
dom draw - it does not matter, of course, where in the state they live 
- we would expect to find 77,600 voters - that is our fifty percent 
turnout assumption again, but with an appropriate deduction for hav-
ing removed 60,000 highly probable voters, three percent of the state-
wide total, from the mix when we began. We should expect this 
77,600 to favor FE-V by a margin of 41,128 to 36,474. This result 
follows because the 60,000 S.O.P. stalwarts we chose at the outset rep-
resent three percent of the expected voters and six percent of the ex-
pected S.O.P. voters, so a random draw of the voters who are left 
should have three percent fewer S.O.P. supporters and three percent 
more FE-V supporters. The 60,000 planted S.0.P. loyalists, added to 
the 36,474 we expect to get from the random draw of the 160,000, 
allows the S.O.P. a margin of 96,474 to 41,128 in the three districts, a 
greater than two-to-one electoral margin in each district. Sixty thou-
sand, in other words, yields a quite handsome cushion for error; as a 
practical matter, one could comfortably dominate elections with 
40,000 or even 30,000 S.O.P. supporters. 
Seven districts remain to be composed with 3,500,000 persons, all 
of them eligible to vote. Recall that these 3,500,000 are now a some-
98. THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 1993, at 285 (citing the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1989)). 
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what biased sample of the electorate because we have already identi-
fied and subtracted from the original statewide voter rolls 60,000 
people whom we believe will vote for the S.O.P. We should therefore 
expect these 3,500,000 persons to cast 1,800,000 votes, which is half 
less 60,000 of the original statewide voter rolls. Furthermore, we 
should expect these 1,800,000 votes to divide 930,000 for the FE-V 
and 870,000 for the S.O.P. because we have taken 60,000 from the 
930,000 statewide S.O.P. votes that we postulated at the outset. Our 
next step is to find 500,000 people who satisfy both of two conditions: 
highly likely to vote and highly likely to support FE-V candidates. 
Easily done. All college and university professors except Engineer-
ing and Business School faculty; all members of any affiliate of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), the National Education Association or the American As-
sociation of Social Workers; all subscribers to Tikkun,· all members of 
the Alan Alda fan club . . . and so on. These individuals we now 
designate as a district - an effectively unanimous FE-V district. 
We now have six districts, and 3,000,000 persons, all of voting age, 
left to represent. Here is how the cards lie. We have densely packed 
one of the districts with 500,000 highly motivated FE-V loyalists, and 
three other districts with 60,000 high-probability S.O.P. loyalists, and 
consequently we should expect the remaining, so-far unrepresented 
electorate to cast 1,300,000 votes - that is the fifty percent turnout 
assumption again - which yields 1,300,000 probable voters 
(1,860,000 probable voters out of 3, 720,0000 eligible voters, minus 
60,000, minus 500,000). These 1,300,000 voters should favor the 
S.O.P. over the FE-V by 870,000 to 430,000, better than two to one. 
Distribute these persons randomly, or, better, with a little insouciant 
artistry, and the S.O.P. will effortlessly sweep all six remaining dis-
tricts. The net result: nine S.O.P. representatives are elected, versus 
one FE-V representative elected practically unanimously, despite iden-
tical vote totals for the two parties statewide. 
The one point that remains to be added is this: the forgoing dem-
onstration is not an argument for why printout districts are bad and 
territorial districts are better. Indeed, our argument is quite the oppo-
site. Territorial districts are not better if the only rule they are obliged 
to respect is that of one person, one vote. By the use of noncompact 
and therefore functionally noncontiguous districts, it is a simple pro-
ject to produce a set of territorial districts that are politically isomor-
phic to the case of East Garden. We have described the procedure 
elsewhere,99 and the technique is no secret - certainly not in North 
Carolina. 
99. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 48, at 327-32. 
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IV. CHEATING 
What is wrong with the forgoing picture? Why should we say that 
the East Garden system of representation flunks Civics 101? "Dilu-
tion" of votes is certainly present - but what is "dilution"? After all, 
politics is politics. We may have our compunctions about it, but over 
the years partisan politics has been a remarkably serviceable element 
in sustaining American public life. Why should we think it is cheating 
to gerrymander given that people can vote unhindered, governments 
honestly count their votes, and no one interferes with their underlying 
preferences? 
The term self-dealing captures the two related considerations that 
seem to make up the intuition that this is cheating. First, the people 
who are drawing the lines and the people who are standing for election 
are in an agency relationship with one another. In effect, the people 
who are in the legislature get an important, and sometimes decisive, 
share of the decision about who will be in the legislature. Second, a 
legislature that constitutes itself tampers with its own legitimacy, 
which comes from without, not from within. The legislature's power 
is not a reflexive ipse dixit - any assembly can call itself a legislature. 
Whether it actually is one depends on extramural issues, such as 
whether a constitution and an electorate have authorized it to exercise 
power. 
The problem, however, is not merely that of self-dealing. Any 
dealing, whether self or not, would seem obnoxious. As an illustra-
tion, consider the imaginary game of Dealer's Choice, which is played 
as follows: Five or more people stand in a circle and give a dollar to 
the dealer. The dealer then gives the entire pot to one of the players, 
on any basis that she chooses. 
Why are people reluctant to play this game? After all, it has a 
much higher expected payout-to-ante ratio than a typical lottery. 
Moreover, it is very like roulette, and there are queues of people wait-
ing to play roulette. But the games are different. In a lottery or in 
roulette, outcomes are random but predictable by a probabilistic rule. 
In Dealer's Choice, the players do not know the basis upon which the 
dealer will award the pot. If they knew, with hypothetical certainty of 
1.0, that the dealer would behave just like a lottery or a roulette wheel, 
probably they would play Dealer's Choice interchangeably with those 
games. But people never "know" such things about other people. 
Furthermore, the things they do know about other people should 
make them hesitate to play Dealer's Choice. 
First, people know about human nature - that people are some-
times corrupt and that sometimes they make side deals. Second, they 
know their own information about the dealer is imperfect. The dealer 
may be a straight-ahead person, but there is some chance that her dis-
cretion will not perfectly replicate the "discretion" of a roulette wheel. 
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Surely she is corruptible; maybe she is already corrupt. Maybe, in 
fact, she has a shill among the players. People, on the whole, are more 
content to have their lives and fortunes spoiled by chance than ruined 
by the will of an arbitrary master. 100 
The hypothetical draws nearer to political mapmaking if, instead 
of the dealer awarding the kitty arbitrarily, she openly solicits bids, in 
the form of kickbacks, from the players. In this version she decides 
who will win on the basis of whoever is willing to give her the best 
deal. Not only is the game governed by the will of a human actor, that 
actor - the dealer - is herself a player of the game who makes up the 
rules as she goes along. No one other than the dealer's kith and kin 
would willingly play such a game. 
This second version of Dealer's Choice is a cameo of what is wrong 
with any kind of gerrymandering, whether of the partisan Davis v. 
Bandemer 101 variety or of the Shaw v. Reno 102 racial variety. It corre-
sponds to no defensible notion of democratic process, whether or not it 
satisfies the constitutional tests that have hitherto satisfactorily dis-
posed of the cases that have arisen. Nor should we necessarily criti-
cize the doctrine, as it has developed to this point necessarily, for 
failure to worry much about partisan gerrymanders. As Bruce Cain 
and others have pointed out, a wholesale hijacking of the electoral pro-
cess such as the one we have described has simply been infeasible. 103 
One requires better information about voters - who is likely to vote, 
how likely, and for whom - than has been readily available. Until 
recently, that is, the dealer did not know how to behave as anything 
other than a roulette wheel. Now thanks to new survey research data 
and new computers, she is rapidly learning. It remains, however, to 
demonstrate the existence of a judicially manageable criterion for 
resolving a gerrymandering complaint. 
V. THE ANTIGERRYMANDERING PRINCIPLE 
Gerrymandering - whether racial or partisan - and the sort of 
cheating described in Part IV are cut from the same cloth. What 
makes them objectionable is the notion that the legislature has strayed 
from its proper domain and played too large a role in constituting 
itself. The VRA as applied against at-large, multimember districts 
seems to have viewed legislative self-constitution skeptically and 
sought to limit the practices that too shamelessly pointed in this direc-
tion. It is neither incoherent nor imprudent to think of the Depart-
100. JOHN LoCKE, AN EsSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 3d ed. 1966) (Oxford 1690). 
101. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
102. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
103. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 146 (1984); Schuck, supra note 64, 
at 1341-47. 
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ment of Justice or the federal courts as extrapolitical actors to keep 
legislative self-dealing within decent bounds. But there are decided 
limits on how constructive such extrasystem interventions can be un-
less they are structured by principles that describe how to limit legisla-
tive discretion. In Shaw, for example, the Attorney General rejected 
the legislature's original plan and returned the matter to the state as-
sembly where the VRA ironically authorized or required, rather than 
limited, legislative self-constitution.104 
The antigerrymandering principle we have in mind is easily spliced 
to the existing system of territorial districting that is constrained by 
the principle of one person, one vote. The principle simply requires 
that territorial districts be contiguous and as compact as possible. By 
themselves, those intuitive and traditional attributes of territorial dis-
tricts are capable of taking the profit out of gerrymandering in most 
cases. 
The antigerrymandering principle as we have described it requires 
adherence to three criteria in drawing SMDPV districts. Districts 
must be (1) of equal population; (2) contiguous; and (3) compact. 
There is some room, admittedly, for a certain amount of pedantic fina-
gling with respect to these terms, but realistic and workable definitions 
are available. 105 The intuition behind the antigerrymandering princi-
ple is that the three criteria are functionally interdependent. If any 
one criterion is ignored, though the others were scrupulously obeyed, a 
partisan mapmaker is free to create a world that is indistinguishable 
from the unsavory world of printout districts. 106 All three rules are 
necessary to check electoral manipulation. 
In the American political tradition, the criterion that has been ig-
nored is that of compactness, and those who would tamper with the 
electoral system have thus created uncompact gerrymanders - for 
reasons of partisan advantage as well as to comply with the VRA. A 
compactness criterion would end most partisan gerrymandering and 
prevent the ugly districts that the Shaw court found objectionable.107 
Moreover, this procedure, which is already embodied in the Attorney 
General's regulations governing section 5 preclearance, 108 effectively 
104. 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20. 
105. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 48, at 323 n.113 (definitions of equal population), 330 
(contiguity), 339-51 (compactness). 
106. For an extended discussion of this interdependence, see id. at 327-32. 
107. Some commentators have doubted the efficacy of compactness as a check on gerryman-
dering, and it cannot be denied that the antigerrymandering principle does not make it impossi-
ble to gerrymander. It always makes it more difficult, however, and in many cases so difficult 
that it might as well be abandoned as a cost-effective approach to garnering political power. For 
a discussion, see id. at 332-34. In any case, it is a weak criticism of a proposed reform that it does 
not completely cure the problem. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: 
Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. I (1969) (arguing that criticisms of the free market must be 
compared to available alternatives instead of ideal solutions). 
108. 28 C.F.R. § 51.59(t) (1992). 
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can limit - not eradicate, but keep reasonably decorous - the prob-
lem of legislative self-constitution. The Department of Justice cur-
rently says that, in judging whether a practice abridges the right to 
vote on account of race and so forth, it will consider certain factors, 
including: "the extent to which the plan departs from ... relevant 
factors such as compactness and contiguity." The Shaw map astonish-
ingly cleared this hurdle, which means, we suppose, that to consider 
everything is to consider nothing. 
Requiring that elections be held within fair territorial districts im-
plies some notion of contiguity and compactness, for these attributes 
are inherent in what is ordinarily understood by a "territorial" dis-
trict. Territorial districts are distinguished from printout districts by 
the property of location. A "district" scattered around like the spots 
on a Dalmatian does not answer this description; location carries at 
least a rough implication of contiguity. But, as the Shaw map rather 
tamely illustrates, contiguity is an entity easily mocked. Contiguity is 
meaningless as an element of locality unless it implies some ingredient 
of compactness. 
Printout districts do not have the property of location. In princi-
ple they are capable of reflecting whatever values a decisionmaker 
wishes to have represented in the electoral process. As the case of 
East Garden shows, printout districts are the easiest system to gerry-
mander if districtmakers have discretion over whom to assign to 
which district - even if that discretion is always subject to the re-
quirement of one person, one vote. But printout districts can as easily 
be rendered gerrymanderproof if constituted as completely random af-
fairs, with citizens assigned to districts by a tamper-proof computer 
program. Every member of an East Garden family of ten could con-
ceivably be sorted into a different printout district. Such a system can 
be made quite safe from a self-dealing legislature or its agent, but it 
seems to possess little normative appeal. 
A preference for territorial districts, single-member or otherwise, 
emerges independently from an antigerrymandering principle. Peo-
ple's lives are organized and lived in places. Where one lives, works, 
shops, where one's children go to school, the means of access from 
place to place, the people one encounters in all of these venues, the 
rules of engagement in all the resulting relationships, the patterns of 
political and social influence, "the webs of affiliation" that give indi-
viduality to social human beings109 - all possess a definite territorial 
element. 
Formal political structures are especially important for patterning 
the interactions and relationships of strangers - not only people 
whose interests we know conflict with our own, but also those whose 
109. See generally Georg Simmel, The Web of Group-Affiliations, in CONFLICT AND THE 
WEB OF GROUP-AFFILIATIONS 125 (Reinhard Bendix & Kurt H. Wolff trans., 1955). 
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interests are unknown. Cooperative social behavior is natural for very 
small communities - families, neighborhoods, and so on - but diffi-
cult to sustain among strangers - or, in jargon, nonrepeat players.110 
The strangers whose lives most touch and affect us, whose primary 
behavior most intersects with ours, live near at hand rather than far 
away~ 
This perception would seem inducement enough to prefer territo-
rial to printout districts - if territorial districts could be made tamper 
proof. It is reasonable to fear that, if the people who operate the legis-
lative process have unlimited authority to constitute it as they will, 
sooner or later - and no doubt by insensible degrees and without the 
necessity of any mapmaker possessing the mens rea for larceny - they 
will begin to confound the general interest and their own. It is reason-
able, in other words, to fear that East Garden is a sketch of the future 
of democratic politics, whose arrival awaits only the acquisition of bet-
ter tools for identifying and categorizing voters. 
We cannot make territorial districts tamper proof to the same ex-
tent as printout districts. Even if one accepts our antigerrymandering 
technique of contiguous and maximally compact districts, mapmakers 
retain significant discretion to cant territorial districts toward the sat-
isfaction of partisan objectives. It is still possible for them to merge 
the districts of popular opposite-party representatives; it is still possi-
ble for them to protect their own favored incumbents. It is still possi-
ble, in other words, for the mapmakers to play normal politics with 
politically constitutive rules. But the rule of contiguous and compact 
territory makes the game many times harder for them to play success-
fully and reduces to insignificance the fear that partisan operators will 
steal elections. 111 
As a practical matter, the antigerrymandering principle could be 
administered rather simply in federal district court. Let the official 
mapmakers have the first move. If some complainant comes forward 
with a redistricting plan that beats the official plan for contiguous-
compactness, let that constitute a prima facie case of unconstitutional 
gerrymandering. Such a system gives mapmakers virtuous incentives 
in the starting gate. Maps like the one in Shaw would never be seen 
again. 
Who would be entitled to proffer such an alternate map? Such a 
question fairly raises one of the nagging aspects of the whole of voting-
rights jurisprudence - namely, it does not fit well within the catego-
ries of legal or constitutional rights used in most litigation. When the 
government counts everyone's vote, when the government obeys the 
one-person-one-vote principle, when everyone's vote is equal, then 
finding an "individual" right for one person amounts to imposing a 
110. See generally ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
111. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 48, at 332-34. 
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duty on another to refrain from voting for his own self-interest or con-
ception of the general good. Such personalized formulations, whether 
one calls them deprivations of equal protection or of an opportunity to 
participate and elect, completely fail to capture the pith of the prob-
lem. The problem is that somebody has stolen the election. In other 
words, the claim resembles the grievance in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon. 112 Ordinarily, complaints of this kind do not state a cause of 
action in federal court. A successful plaintiff must have a particular-
ized claim of an injury that flows from the assertedly unlawful assump-
tion of executive or legislative power. 113 No one in East Garden has 
such a particularized claim. The Shaw plaintiffs tried to go forward 
with a Mellon-like claim,114 but the Supreme Court proceeded on a 
different theory. 
There seems to be little justification for sidestepping the issue just 
because all one has is Professor Jaffe's non-Hohfeldian plaintiff1 15 who 
has received no injury that is concrete and particular to himself and 
who can allege no violation of his own "rights," as they are conven-
tionally understood. F/ast v. Cohen 116 is the model exception to the 
general rule of standing; it would allow "citizens" in a gerrymandered 
state, if they had a better plan in hand, to complain without the pre-
tense that they have received a rights injury in the ordinary sense. 
The case for allowing this exception is stronger than that presented 
in Flast, which allowed plaintiffs without a personal or particularized 
stake to complain of federal money being spent to finance religious 
instruction in religious schools. Everyone understands that the true 
justification for the Flast exception to the rule of Mell on is that govern-
ment should not be allowed to subsidize religion unconstitutionally 
only because no one with a uniquely concrete and particularized injury 
112. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). In Mellon, an individual taxpayer alleged the injury of a heavier 
tax burden in her attempt to enjoin a federal statute. The Court held that the suit could not be 
maintained on such an injury, for the causal relation of the statute to the plaintiff's taxes was 
"uncertain" and, in any event, was a burden "shared with millions of others." 262 U.S. at 486· 
88. 
113. See 262 U.S. at 488 (holding plaintiff must show a "direct injury" and "not merely that 
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally"). 
114. 
[Plaintiffs] did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitution· 
ally "diluted" white voting strength. They did not even claim to be white. Rather, appel· 
!ants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on 
the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind" electoral 
process. 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993). 
115. See LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 483 (1965). Jaffe 
is discussed in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 n.7 (1968). 
The reference in the text is to Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Co11ceptio11s as 
Applied i11 Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
116. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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can be found to protest. 117 But rent seeking by religious groups is 
similar to rent seeking by many a nonreligious group, albeit with an 
especially sinister and politically reactive history. This history may 
well be considered terrible enough to justify a special provision in the 
Bill of Rights and special standing rules to eliminate the problem. 
But, at the end of the day, other forms of legislative self-seeking by 
factions pose a challenge to democracy that is more or less continuous 
with self-seeking of the religious kind. It is normal politics; in other 
words, it is the usual stuff of legislative practice. 
But the constitution of the legislature, "the first and fundamental 
Act of Society,"118 is altogether different. Although the details of or-
ganization are left in the hands of the legislature itself, 119 there must 
be a limit to its power to control the rules of its self-constitution 
which, being "constitutional," are prior to and outside of normal poli-
tics. One implication is that the constitutional rule for legislatures 
must originate extramurally and must ultimately be administered ex-
tramurally and not by the legislature itself. The case of East Garden 
proves that proposition by indicating what can follow if one assumes 
the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The antigerrymandering principle that we have in mind does not 
assume to take the politics altogether out of politics, but only to recog-
nize and control skewed incentives at the heart of democratic practice. 
It has an additional, practical advantage. Any territorially compact 
minority will tend to gain - in the sense of "electoral success," the 
VRA's basic criterion of "opportunity" - from an antigerrymander-
ing principle. So, we strongly suspect, would the black population of 
North Carolina, geographically dispersed though it is, if the partisan 
makeup of the congressional delegation and the safety of its most pow-
erful incumbents had not been taken by the mapmakers as lexically 
prior concerns. 
"Districting," as Justice Souter said, "inevitably is the expression 
of interest group politics."120 Justice White notes elsewhere: "it re-
quires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of 
drawing a district line along one street rather than another." 121 
Again, "[p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from 
117. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 425 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (Cam-
bridge 1690). 
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
120. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2836 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
121. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). 
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districting and apportionment."122 Justice White's observations are 
fair enough; practical people should not get carried away by utopian 
idealizations of the political system and overestimate the comparative 
wisdom of judges. The institutional costs of intercepting every last bit 
of systemic self-dealing may often be too great to justify judicial 
action. 123 
Nevertheless, there is a crucial distinction between normal politics 
and constitutive politics. Those who deny this distinction or refuse to 
make it deserve honorary life citizenship in East Garden. If we do not 
aim to extirpate the politically strategic behavior of mapmakers, we 
should try to stop them from stealing elections - from self-dealing 
and from constituting the legislature by partisan rules. We can insist 
on being governed by the territorial principle and let the chips fall 
where they may. 
The notion of "letting the chips fall where they may" imbues this 
subject with an intriguing subtext. Many scholars of electoral systems 
believe that an antigerrymandering principle of the kind we suggest 
would, as a generalization, tend to favor Republicans. 124 Shaw seems 
to have recognized that the Constitution cannot allow any version of 
this objection whatsoever. When the legislature of North Carolina 
generates districts as ugly as the Twelfth, it is in effect claiming, albeit 
by means of a heavily camouflaged circumlocution, that it has a right 
to make sure that blacks' electoral gains come largely at the expense of 
Republicans rather than fellow Democrats. If one were looking for a 
first principle upon which to found a jurisprudence of the ugly, one 
could find no better place to start. 
122. 412 U.S. at 753. 
123. Of course one tolerates allocative inefficiencies when the costs of remedying them are 
too great. Cf. George Stigler, Law or Economics?, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 455 (1992). 
124. Only Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, however, seem to have had the exis-
tential courage to acknowledge that this is the real objection to the antigerrymandering principle. 
Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public 
Interest: Elusive of Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23-27 (1985). 
